Girona, a La Liga team, and Manchester City, a Premier League team, are separated by the English Channel and France. Girona, after starting the season in red-hot form and unexpectedly finding themselves at the top of the La Liga table, now sit in second. Manchester City, the once outcast turned Premier League powerhouse, currently sits second in the table in what will be a photo finish in the Premier League this season. Manchester City is playing in the Champions League knockout rounds, while Girona did not qualify for European competition this season. The teams play in different leagues, different competitions, different countries, and will not play each other this season…so why does Girona have a Manchester City problem?

Mutual Ownership

The simple answer is City Football Group (CFG). City Football Group, majority-owned by Abu Dhabi United Group and linked with the Abu Dhabi royal family, launched its first foray into club ownership in 2008 when the Group purchased the then-financially unstable Manchester City Football Club. Since that first foray, City Football Group has purchased large or majority stakes in eleven other soccer clubs across the globe, and while Manchester City remains its crown jewel, City Football Group also has stakes in New York City Football Club (US), Montevideo City Torque (Uruguay), Palermo F.C. (Italy), and Bahia (Brazil). In 2017, City Football Group acquired a stake in a small club in a Catalonian town part-owned by the brother of Manchester City manager Pep Guardiola. That club: Girona F.C. The La Liga side benefited from its City Football Group links, with players like Yan Couto, Savio, and Valentin (Taty) Castellanos all moving on loan to Girona F.C. from other City Football Group-owned clubs.

Why This Matters

Currently, City Football Group claims to own a 47% stake in Girona along with its 100% stake in Manchester City. Both teams are also in Champions League-qualified spots for next year, with each of the top four team in La Liga and the Premier League automatically qualifying for the following season’s Champions League competition. The problem: UEFA, the European soccer governing body which runs the Champions League competition, does not allow multiple clubs with the same majority stakeholder to compete in the UEFA competitions.

Now this is not a rule without exceptions: in 2017, UEFA allowed both RB Leipzig and RB Salzburg to compete in the same UEFA competition. Both clubs, owned by Red Bull, were determined to have sufficiently independent governing and operational structures so as to not interfere with the competition. UEFA has also issued waivers in the 2022/2023 seasons for three ownership groups who owned majority stakes in multiple clubs, though these clubs were not competing in the same UEFA competitions as one another.

Currently, Girona and Manchester City would not need a waiver, as Girona states City Football Group owns 47%, a non-majority stake in the club, though the Group is the largest stakeholder. However, if both of these teams qualify for the Champions League and UEFA discovers City Football Group, or individuals representing City Football Group’s interest, own more than 50% of Girona, then City Football Group would need a waiver in order to allow Manchester City and Girona to both play in the 2024/2025 Champions League competition. Additionally, if UEFA unearthed the >50% ownership stake through an investigation rather than the clubs being honest about its ownership stakes, then UEFA would be less inclined to grant that waiver.

Now, the obvious question is: City Football Group states they own a 47% stake in Girona. Why doesn’t UEFA just trust they own the amount Girona they claim to own? First, it’s important to note Manchester City, owned wholly by City Football Group, is currently charged with more than 100 breaches of Premier League financial rules. While they have not been convicted of any of these breaches, it’s fair to view claims of accuracy related to financial information from City Football Group skeptically at this time. Second, sports ownership business arrangements can sometimes include structure percentage purchases over the course of a specific period of time. For example, City Football Group may have an agreement with billionaire Marcelo Claure, who owns a 35% stake Girona, to purchase 5% of the team for a specific price. Although there is no public information regarding any agreement, if that were the case, this would make City Football Group the majority shareholder in Girona, and the club would be required to obtain a waiver by UEFA to participate in the competition. A waiver which may be denied given the Premier League financial breach investigation.

Conclusion

Girona has had an outstanding rise. From La Liga 2 to UEFA Champions League in 2 years is impressive, even with the backing of the Abu Dhabi royal family (Girona was relegated from La Liga in 2019 and earned promotion after the 2021/2022 Liga 2 season). However, if Girona finishes in the top 4 in the La Liga table this season, they still may miss out on the 2024/2025 Champions League competition. If City Football Group were to choose which team would participate, the team from the Catalonian town of 100,000 people with no history in the competition would likely be brushed aside by the Manchester City, the Premier League powerhouse and winners of the 2022/2023 Champions League title.

A few months ago, in the Saudi transfer recap, I had some harsh words for Jordan Henderson. I said “turns out, loyalty and values can be bought” and essentially said Henderson sold his soul for a big Saudi payday (3 years, £36.4m per year). Well, Henderson sold his soul, and didn’t even get the big payday.

What Happened?

Henderson, like many players who moved to Saudi for a big payday, had difficulty adjusting to life on the Arabian Peninsula. After underwhelming performances and appearing to be unhappy with living in the Kingdom, Henderson and Al Ettifaq agreed to terminate his contract so he could move back to Europe on a free transfer. Henderson, a Liverpool legend who could have signed a new contract with Liverpool before leaving for Al Ettifaq last summer, moved to Ajax in Amsterdam.

How Much Money Did Henderson Make?

At £36.4m per year, most people could retire and live a lavish life after a 6 month stay. Given the yearly salary, most people would think Henderson made around £15-20 million. Henderson, the man who sold his soul for a big payday, reportedly made £0 playing in Saudi Arabia.

If Henderson Had Such a Large Contract, Why Didn’t He Make a Cent?

The short answer is taxes. I am a lawyer, but I am certainly not a British tax lawyer or British CPA, so there may be some intricacies in this that I have neglected and this should in no way constitute legal advice.

Henderson chose to defer his original wages with Al Ettifaq. The reason Henderson deferred his wages is for resident tax reasons. In the UK, an individual is considered a resident for tax purposes if the individual spends more than 90 days in the country. Henderson’s advisors reportedly told him that he and his family would be considered tax residents of the UK if they spent more than 21 days in the UK, based on a pro rata formula. In order to allow his wife and children to visit relatives in the UK without any time restrictions, Henderson deferred his wages until 2024 to reset the tax residency time restrictions.

Henderson hoped, as a Saudi tax resident, he could pay the Saudi income tax rate on the wages (0%) rather than the British income tax rate (~50%). However, because of his greed, Henderson ended up with £0 from his time in Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

It’s been a tough 6 months for Jordan. Henderson moved his family, ruined his reputation with Scousers, sold his soul shilling for a dictatorial regime, and made £0 while doing it. Personally, I have no sympathy for him. He got what he deserved.

A couple years ago, I posted about Barcelona and its current strategic flaw. Essentially, the argument was Barcelona moved away from its strategy to develop players through La Masia and supplement that roster. Instead, under the financially disastrous presidency of Bartomeu, Barcelona was selling or releasing talented youth players for practically nothing while going out and purchasing name-brand players, paying huge transfer fees and wages to bring these other talents in. Barcelona spent hundreds of millions of dollars on names like Dembele, Griezmann, Pjanic, Umtiti, Coutinho, and Lenglet while talented young players left for minimal fees. This spending moved the club away from the ‘Develop through La Masia’ identity, and the over-spending led the club to the brink of financial ruin.

Barcelona now has some talented young players getting first-team minutes, players like Lamine Yamal, Marc Guiu, Gavi, Marc Casado, Alejandro Balde, and Fermin Lopez. The Blaugrana have also already supplemented these ranks with Pedri, the young midfielder from the Canary Islands, and Vitor Roque, the Brazilian wonderkid. However, Barcelona has implemented a new strategy for some youth players, one that we will call the Buyback Strategy. It is too early to judge whether this strategy will be effective or pay dividends for Barcelona, but it is not to early to describe the strategy, including the complex world of loans, transfer clauses, and sell-on percentages.

International Loans

The fundamentals of the buyback strategy are based on the loan system used in international soccer. Teams loan out players, or allow players to play for another team, for a period of time. This period of time is traditionally a season long loan, or until the end of the season if it is a winter transfer window loan, but the period of time is set in the terms of the loan contract.

There are essentially three types of loan contracts: loan, loan with option to buy, and loan with purchase obligation. A standard loan allows a player to play for another team for the prescribed period of time without including language regarding the potential purchase of the loaned player during or at the end of the loan period. A loan with the option to buy allows a player to be loaned to a team for a season, with the potential for the team to purchase the player for a set price prescribed in the loan contract.

There are two types of loans with purchase obligations: a mandatory obligation and a conditional obligation. A loan with a mandatory obligation means the player loaned to a team will be purchased by that team for a specified transfer fee on an enumerated date. A loan with a conditional obligation means that the team where the player is on loan will be required to purchase the loaned player for a specified price if certain conditions are met. For example, the loan contract may specify the player must be purchased if the player makes 20 appearances for the team over the course of the loan. If the player makes 20 appearances, then the team is required to pay the agreed upon transfer fee to the player’s parent club. However, if the player on makes 19 appearances during the course of the loan, the team where the player was loaned is under no obligation to pay the player’s parent club the specified transfer fee or complete the transfer.

Both loans with options to buy and loans with obligations to purchase, like any other transfer move, can contain “buyback” clauses. The means that the player is purchased by another club, but the original club retains the right to re-purchase that same player for a specified fee. For example, a play may be transfer from Club A to Club B for €5 million, but Club A retains a buyback option to re-purchase the player from Club B for €8 million if the player is re-purchased within two seasons. Both types of loans also can include rights to future transfer fees. For examples, Club A transfers Player to Club B for €5 million and 20% of any profits Club B may receive from the future transfer of Player. Club B then sells Player to Club C for €10 million. Club A is legally entitled to €2 million (20% of the fee) from Player’s transfer to Club C.

What is the Buyback Strategy?

Barcelona’s buyback strategy for youth players is as follows: Barcelona has talented youth players in La Masia who are not yet ready to play for the Barcelona first team. Barcelona, through either a transfer, a loan with an option to buy or a loan with an obligation to buy, allows these young players to leave the club and play significant minutes at other clubs, accelerating the development of these players. Each youth transfer or loan includes a buyback clause, allowing Barcelona to re-purchase the player for a specified price. Additionally, Barcelona has inserted the right to future transfer fees in these contracts. This way, if Barcelona decides to re-purchase the player and holds a 50% right to future transfers, Barcelona, functionally, only needs to pay 50% of the buyback fee, since Barcelona would receive the other 50% of profits from any transfer.

Concrete examples may help clarify how these strategy works, and Barcelona has graciously provided us with three real world examples: Ez Abde, Chadi Riad, and Nico Gonzalez.

Abdessamad Ezzalzouli, also known as Ez Abde, moved to Barcelona B from Hercules in 2021. After oscillating between Barcelona B and Barcelona’s first team, Ez Abde was loaned to Osasuna for the 2022-2023 season in order to get more regular minutes. The 22-year-old impressed on loan, but Barcelona still decided he was not going to receive the first team minutes the winger needed to develop. So, in the summer 2023 transfer window, Ez Abde was sold to Real Betis for €7.5 million. The sale included a €20 million buyback option for Barcelona, as well as 50% of any future transfer fee. Barcelona made €7.5 million from the sale of Ez Abde, could buy the player back for €10 million (50% of €20 million), and profits from any future sale of the player if they choose to not exercise the buyback clause.

Like Ez Abde, Chadi Riad bounced between Barcelona B and the Barcelona first team. In order to get more regular first team minutes, Barcelona loaned the 20-year-old to Real Betis during the summer 2023 transfer window. The season-long loan included an option for Real Betis to purchase the young center-back for €3.5 million. The deal also contained a buyback option for Barcelona. Should Real Betis exercise the option to purchase, Barcelona could buy Riad back for €7 million. This appears to be the case, as reports indicate that Real Betis intend to exercise the option to purchase for €3.5 million and Barcelona, who have been impressed by Riad’s play at Real Betis, plan to exercise the buyback clause and pay Real Betis €7 million to have Riad back at Camp Nou.

The final example is Nico Gonzalez. The Galician midfielder came up through La Masia and broke into the Barcelona first team; however, the 22-year-old was not get the regular minutes he needed to develop. After a loan spell with Valencia during the 2022-2023 season, Nico was sold during the 2023 summer transfer window to FC Porto for €8.5 million. As part of the transfer agreement, Barcelona inserted a €30 million buyback clause and would receive 40% of a future transfer fee.

How often Barcelona will chose to exercise the buyback clauses remains to be seen, but there is clearly a new development and transfer strategy at Camp Nou: sell young players for low transfer fees with large future transfer fee percentages so young players can get regular minutes, and exercise the buyback clauses when recently-sold young players prove worthy of regular first team minutes with the Blaugrana.  

Hi everyone, I’m back! It’s been far too long, but there have been some significant changes. A new job, a new city, and a new…season! There were all sorts of big-time summer transfers, from Declan Rice moving across London to Harry Kane’s €100 million Bavarian move to Jude Bellingham’s spectacular start at his new home in Madrid. However, one story dominated the summer transfer window: Saudi Arabia’s summer spending. Spending nearly €1 billion on transfer fees alone, the Saudi Public Investment Fund spent an unbelievable amount of money. There will be significant discussions surrounding this spending, including sportswashing questions, Financial Fair Play discussions, and whether this level of spending by a public investment fund is good for soccer; in fact, all of those questions could take a book or more to resolve. Given the sheer volume of Saudi summer transfers, this article simply aims to break down the most notable moves to the oil-rich nation.

Why is Saudi Spending?

While there has been no comment from Saudi Arabia confirming why the Saudis are spending so much on soccer (and sports generally), Occam’s Razor provides some insight: after being excoriated by the international community, the Saudis see sport as an ideal way to launder their reputation, also known as sportswashing. Executing this sportswashing strategy is the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund, the sovereign wealth fund for Saudi Arabia.

The Public Investment Fund, or PIF, was established in the 1970’s with a goal of providing financing to projects of strategic significance to the national economy. Over the years, the PIF has funded oil and natural gas infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, and is even being used to finance entire cities (i.e. Neom). Using the PIF for sportswashing purposes, however, started after the murder of a Washington Post journalist in 2018. Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist critical of the Saudi regime, was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, devised a plan to lure Khashoggi to the Saudi consulate in Turkey, where he was then murdered and dismembered by a Saudi special operations death squad, known as Tiger Squad. This murder left Saudi Arabia ostracized by much of the international community. In order to rehabilitate its image, Saudi Arabia developed a sportswashing plan and used the PIF to execute that plan.

The first major move in the Saudi sportswashing plan was the acquisition of Newcastle United. An English Premier League team, Newcastle had long been rumored to be up for sale, with then-owner Mike Ashley refusing to invest in the team, earning significant distain from the Geordie fan base. In April 2020, the PIF led a consortium of companies and individuals which purchased Newcastle United for £300 million. However, other Premier League owners refused to approve the sale, with many citing the Khashoggi murder and sportswashing in their opposition to the acquisition. In October 2021, the British government forced Premier League approval of the sale despite the owners resistance; it was later reported Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince, contacted then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and threatened UK-Saudi diplomatic relations if the Sale was not approved, though the UK government denies this.

While completing the Newcastle United portion of its sportswashing plan, Saudi Arabia initiated a new prong of the plan: LIV Golf. Founded in 2021 with financing from the PIF, LIV Golf was launched to be a competitor to the PGA Tour. LIV Golf wasted no time, hiring well-known golfer Greg Norman to be its CEO and paying players obscene amounts of money to join the LIV Golf Tour. Some players, like Masters winners Phil Mickelson, Dustin Johnson, and Sergio Garcia were each paid hundreds of millions of dollars to participate in the LIV Golf Tour. Other players, such as Tiger Woods and Rory McIlroy, refused to join the LIV Golf Tour, turning down massive sums of money because they did not want to “be in bed” with a murderous autocracy. Some would later argue turning down the money was a mistake, as the PIF’s financial backing of LIV was too great for the PGA Tour to overcome: In June 2023, the PGA Tour and LIV agreed to merge into a new for-profit corporation, funded by the PIF.

While funding the new LIV Golf venture, the PIF “acquired” and took control of the four largest teams in the Saudi Pro League: Al Nassr, Al Hilal, Al Ittihad, and Al Ahli. The exact details of PIF acquiring the control stakes in each team are murky, and nothing suggests that these stakes were acquired via non-voluntary means, but Saudi Arabia is autocratic, so that’s not outside the realm of possibility. In addition to the acquisitions, the Saudi Pro League proactively recruited players, using massive wage packages to lure star players to a previously unknown league. Below is a list of the notable players who swapped careers in top leagues for the huge pay packets promised by moving to Saudi Arabia.

The Players

Sergej Milinkovic-Savic, Age 28, Al-Hilal, €40 million transfer fee

Lazio’s Champions League qualification was not enough to keep their star Serbian midfielder from defecting to the Middle East. The 28-year-old box-to-box midfielder left Serie A and his brother behind for a massive payday, reportedly a three-year deal worth €20 million per season. At 31, when his contract expires, Milinkovic-Savic may have a chance to play in Europe again, but he certainly won’t need to after that payday. While some teams were left empty-handed or getting pennies in exchange for players, Lazio scored too with this deal, getting a €40 million transfer fee for the midfielder.

Ruben Neves, Age 26, Al-Hilal, €55 million transfer fee

Those following the various Neves sagas may have been confounded by the 26-year-old midfielder’s move to Saudi. The Portuguese and Wolverhampton star was linked to some massive European clubs, including Barcelona, during the summer 2023 transfer window. However, the former Porto man was enticed to the Middle East with a huge pay packet: nearly £16 million per year without any taxes. Neves, just entering his peak at age 26, will be available on a free transfer as a 29-year-old midfielder, plenty of time to still play for a world-renowned European club, if they’ll have him, after his stint in Saudi. Like Lazio, Wolverhampton was not left empty-handed, with the Wolves commanding a €55 million transfer fee for their midfield maestro.

Fabinho, Age 29, Al-Ittihad, €46.7 million transfer fee

Brazilian midfielder Fabinho swapped the cold rain of the English coast for the hot Saudi desert.

Fabinho, on a three-year deal like many others, didn’t leave former team Liverpool holding the bag, receiving a €46.7 million transfer fee for the 29-year-old’s services. A large transfer fee is great, but the player must also agree to a contract with the new club. In Fabinho’s case, he was enticed to Saudi Arabia with a £700,000 per week contract (£36.4 million per year). Fabinho will be 32 years old when his contract in Saudi expires which is still youthful for some defensive midfielders (just ask his national teammate Fernandinho). Maybe Fabinho will return to Europe, maybe he’ll head back home and play in Brazil, but one thing is certain: wherever he goes next, he won’t be short on cash.

Malcom, Age 26, Al-Hilal, €60 million transfer fee

Only 26 years-old, Malcom has already had quite a career journey. Breaking through with his home town club, Sao Paulo-based Corinthians, Malcom secured a move to French team Bordeaux. After impressing with the wine region club, Malcom secured a dream move to Barcelona in a €41 million move (back when that was a significant fee). However, Malcom’s dream turned into a nightmare in the Mediterranean oasis: poor performances and passport issues left the Spanish club wildly underwhelmed. After one turbulent season, Malcom abandoned his dream for the dark and cold Russian tundra, signing for Zenit St. Petersburg. The Brazilian winger now trades one authoritarian dictatorship for another. The Sao Paulo born player finds himself far from home but earning a significant payday: he reportedly signed a four-year deal worth €18 million per season. Malcom, who will be 30 when his contract expires, could give his European dream another chance in the future, but something tells me his next destination is either whichever club gives him a massive deal or back home to Brazil.

Sadio Mane, Age 31, Al-Nassr, €30 million transfer fee

“Well, that went poorly” accurately describes Sadio Mane’s last 12 months. After pushing for and securing a move from Liverpool to Bayern Munich, things went downhill fast for Mane. The Senegalese forward had multiple injuries, including one which kept him out of the World Cup, and suffered poor form when he was able to play. Things came to a head in April, when he was suspended and fined by Bayern after reportedly punching teammate Leroy Sane in the locker room after a Champions League loss to Man City. While Bayern won the Bundesliga (again), Mane’s departure was inevitable. The most expeditious way to get rid of Mane also happened to come with a huge contract offer for the forward: Bayern secured a €30 million transfer fee, and the once desired forward signed a three-year contract for approximately €30 million per year contract with Al Nassr. Mane joins Ronaldo at Al Nassr, but the once Liverpool fan favorite’s career can be summed up in one Shakespearean-style sentence: “Thus endeth his career, as he fades into obscurity.”

Riyad Mahrez, Age 32, Al-Ahli, €35 million transfer fee

It seems as though “Mahrez on the move” rumors have persisted for the last few years, but this time the rumor is true. The French-Algerian forward, whose name and the Saudi capital are homonyms, secured a €35 million move to the Saudi powerhouse Al-Ahli. The Jeddah-based club, which has found success in both the domestic league and the AFC Champions League, offered a four-year contract worth approximately €30 million per year to the Man City winger, who promptly agreed and headed to Jeddah. The 32-year-old winger, who is destined to retire after this contract, will be best remembered for his Champions League trophy with Man City as well as playing a key role in the greatest Premier League upset of all-time, leading the 5000 to 1 odds Leicester City to the 2015/2016 Premier League title.

Karim Benzema, Age 35, Al-Ittihad, Free transfer

This move, as many of these moves, could be aptly titled “The money was too good.” Benzema, another French-Algerian player, left Real Madrid and its trappings for a new adventure in Saudi. The Blancos captain, who was released from his contract by Real Madrid in recognition of his service to the club so he could secure a free transfer, certain couldn’t have been tired of winning La Liga titles and Champions League trophies. What could have lured him to Saudi Arabia? Well, cash. While reports vary, the 35-year-old striker has reportedly signed a three-year deal worth a staggering €100 million per season. Additionally, the scandal-plagued forward will earn an additional €20 million per year as an “ambassador” for Saudi Arabia’s World Cup bid. If you believe he will need to devote a significant amount of time to his ambassadorial duties, then I have a bridge in Brooklyn to sell you. The Frenchman, who had one year remaining on his Real Madrid contract, could have retired as a Galactico in Madrid, but decided to take the cash instead. That said, Benzema will always be welcomed at the Bernabeu having contributed to 5 Champions League titles and 4 La Liga titles, along with a host of other individual and club awards.

Marcelo Brozovic, Age 30, Al-Nassr, €18 million transfer fee

Brozovic has always been one of those players who doesn’t have out-of-this-world statistics, but is integral to a team’s success. It is fitting, then, that his transfer to Saudi powerhouse Al-Nassr was comparatively below the radar. The Croatian defensive midfield, a mainstay at Inter Milan for the last 7.5 seasons, made the move to the Riyadh-based club for a modest €18 million. The 2018 World Cup runner-up, who was a stalwart in Inter Milan’s 3-5-2/5-3-2 system, required a 3-year contract at approximately €25 million per season to make the move. The PIF, seeing this amount as a rounding error given its total assets, happily obliged, and the Brozovic family said arrivederci to the Nerazzurri.

Roberto Firmino, Age 31, Al-Ahli, Free transfer

Yet another of the Reds traded the cold Liverpudlian coast for the hot sands of Saudi Arabia. Roberto Firmino, set to leave Liverpool on a free, decided to take his talents to Jeddah, signing for Al-Ahli on a free transfer. The former Hoffenheim and Brazilian national team forward, whose opportunities would have been limited by the likes of Luis Diaz, Cody Gakpo, and Diogo Jota, if he returned to Liverpool, signed a three-year deal worth €20 million per season. The forward, who will be 34 years old when his contract expires, will likely have the opportunity to return to his native Brazil to play or retire after his Saudi stay.

Aymeric Laporte, Age 29, Al-Nassr, €27.5 million transfer fee

Aymeric Laporte slipped into anonymity while playing for Manchester City. The French-born Basque center-back arrived with in Manchester in 2018 with much fan-fare given the £57 million the Cityzens paid for his services. After showing promise in his first two seasons, Laporte suffer a horrific knee injury early in the 2019/2020 season. Laporte returned but lost his starting role to John Stones in 2020. Since then, he has been relegated to a bit part, with Pep Guardiola preferring Stones, Kyle Walker, Ruben Diaz, Nathan Ake, and Manuel Akanji at various times. After winning the 2022/2023 Treble, and tired of playing a bit role, the French-born Spanish player explored leaving Manchester City. The Saudi Pro League came calling, offering an obscene amount (€27.5 million) for a bit-part, backup, 29-year-old center-back. Laporte was certainly tempted too, signing a three-year contract worth €25 million per season, an astronomical amount for a center-back who played less than 1,000 minutes in the Premier League the previous season.

Kalidou Koulibaly, Age 32, Al-Hilal, €23 million transfer fee

The much-heralded French-born Senegalese center-back was a bit of a surprise transfer. The 32-year-old center-back, who starred at Napoli before making the switch to Chelsea in 2022, was a starter in the albeit unimpressive Chelsea backline. The former Genk and Metz player was purchased for €38 million in 2022 before being moved to Al-Hilal for €23 million just one season later. Given Koulibaly is a 32-year-old aging center-back, €23 million is an outstanding piece of business, but one wonders whether there is any coherent sporting or transfer strategy at Chelsea, especially given the turmoil at the club over the last 2+ seasons. Either way, Chelsea secured a transfer fee and Koulibaly secured his future, signing a three-year deal worth approximately €35 million per season. To his credit, while other make up reasons like “a new sporting project,” Koulibaly has been honest about his Saudi move, stating he made the move for the money so he can help his whole family “live well” and fund his charity projects. You can fault him for assisting in the sportswashing but at least he’s honest about his motivations.

Luiz Felipe, Age 26, Al-Ittihad, €22 million transfer fee

Like Koulibaly, the Luiz Felipe transfer was a bit of a head-scratcher as well. A 26-year-old center-back, starting for a Europa League qualified team and playing in La Liga gives it all up as he heads into his prime to go play in…Saudi Arabia? The Brazilian-born Italian national team player, who moved from Lazio to Real Betis on a free transfer just one year prior, set his sights on the Saudi Pro League, securing a move to Jeddah-based Al Ittihad for €22 million near the end of the transfer window. The center-back, who allegedly signed a four-year deal for unknown wages, will be 30 years old when the contract expires. Felipe may still have the opportunity to play in Europe after this contract, but we will see if he left Betis and La Liga too soon. While Koulibaly was honest about his motivation to move to Saudi, I imagine Luiz Felipe (and every other player on this list) harbors the same motivation, even if they don’t verbalize it.

N’Golo Kante, Age 32, Al-Ittihad, Free transfer

The World Cup winner and former Chelsea midfielder has been shilling for the Saudi Pro League recently, which is disappointing. Kante, a French international, moved to Jeddah-based Al-Ittihad on a free transfer this summer, joining Al-Ittihad’s other star signee and French compatriot, Karim Benzema. Like Benzema and others, Kante was offered a stunning contract to make the move to Saudi, earning €100 million per year on a three-year deal. The tireless midfielder accumulated some impressive hardware while in Europe: Premier League titles, Champions League title, and 2018 World Cup winner, among others. Al-Ittihad hope both he and Benzema can continue their winning ways with their new club. Kante, known for his ball-winning efforts in the midfield and ability to dictate the pace of play, was reportedly offered other contracts with storied European clubs, though their wage offerings were nowhere near what the Saudis tabled. Kante decided his price to participate in Saudi sportswashing was €100 million per year, and the Saudis gleefully paid that price.

Georginio Wijnaldum, Age 32, Al-Ettifaq, €8 million transfer fee

Gini Wijnaldum has been, for lack of a better word, listless since leaving the confines of Anfield in 2021. Offered wages too good to pass down, incidentally foreshadowing his Saudi move, the Dutch midfielder looked to be headed to Barcelona on a free transfer. However, at the metaphorical eleventh hour, Paris Saint-Germain, owned and backed by Qatari money, offered twice the wages Barcelona offered. That offer was enough to divert Wijnaldum’s flight, and before Barcelona knew it, the ink was drying on Wijnaldum’s PSG deal. About as soon as the ink dried, things went downhill for Wijnaldum in Paris. Believing his talents assured him a starting role, Georginio soon found himself relegated to a rotational/substitute position in the PSG squad. So diminished was his role, Georginio was deemed surplus after the 2021/2022 season and moved to Roma on loan for the 2022/2023 season. Looking to offload the Dutchman to avoid paying him the €10 million net salary due in the 2023/2024 season, PSG accepted a low €8 million transfer fee for the Netherlands international. Wijnaldum signed a three-year deal, and while his Saudi wages have not been disclosed, it was reported Wijnaldum was demanding a massive increase on his PSG wages. Since the Wijnaldum transfer was completed, it’s fair to assume Gini received a pay bump to move to Saudi. As a 32 year old midfield on a three year deal, this may be Gini’s last deal before retiring.

Alex Telles, Age 30, Al-Nassr, €4.6 million transfer fee

The 30 year old left back was a rising star in 2016. After impressing during an Inter Milan loan, the raw but talented left back moved to Porto in 2016. After four years and a surprisingly prolific scoring record, the Brazilian international moved to Manchester United in 2020. His time at Man U was…disappointing given his lofty expectations and €15 million transfer fee. Telles spent two years as a rotational/backup left back before being loaned to Sevilla for the 2022/2023 season. Manchester United, looking to offload the surplus left-back, accepted a €4.6 million pittance for the Brazilian. Telles, lured by an approximately €8 million per year wage, signed a two year deal with Riyadh-based Al-Nassr. Given his underwhelming three seasons as Manchester United and Sevilla, Telles’ time in Europe was likely over, and Al-Nassr may have been among his best options.

Neymar, Age 31, Al-Hilal, €90 million transfer fee

Wunderkind, Generational Talent, Pele’s Heir Apparent at Santos…Neymar has had a number of accolades and descriptors throughout his career. One descriptor has defined Neymar’s career more than any other: injured. The Brazilian forward was living every Brazilian soccer player’s dream: breaking into the Santos first-team, European interest, and a massive move to Barcelona. At Barcelona, Neymar was part of the lethal MSN (Messi-Suarez-Neymar) front three, winning two La Liga titles and the 2014/2015 Champions League. In 2017, Neymar completed a move to PSG for a world record €222 million transfer fee (his buyout clause at Barcelona). True to theme, Neymar’s PSG move is where things went…sideways. When on the field, Neymar was great; however, his time at PSG was mired with injury, lawsuits, COVID quarantine violations, allegations of partying too much, and infidelity allegations. At the end of the 2022/2023 season, PSG decided to overhaul the squad and informed Neymar he was no longer in the team’s plans for the following season. After being linked to a number of prestigious teams, including Barcelona, Newcastle United, and Chelsea, Neymar signed a two-year contract worth approximately €80 million per season with Riyadh-based club Al-Hilal. Additionally, Neymar was provided a mansion, a domestic staff of 25, a fleet of luxury cars, and other amenities to entice him to Saudi Arabia. Along with Ronaldo, Saudi Arabia had two of the three biggest soccer names in the world playing in the Saudi Pro League, bolstering their sportswashing objective.

Jordan Henderson, Age 33, Al-Ettifaq, €14 million transfer fee

Turns out, loyalty and values can be bought, at least this English midfielder’s loyalty and values. Henderson, the self-proclaimed LGBTQ+ ally, faced criticism after moving to Saudi Arabia, a country which criminalizes LGBTQ+ behavior, in order to get a big contract. Kops Out, a supporters’ group for LGBTQ+ Liverpool fans, criticized the move, stating Henderson made the choice to prioritize his own wealth and enable sportswashing rather than stand up for human rights and continue to be an ally. Henderson recently doubled down, supporting Saudi Arabia’s 2034 World Cup bid. Henderson also responded to the criticism, essentially saying ‘I’m sorry they feel that way,’ a comment that could generously be characterized as underwhelming. Henderson is signed a three-year contract and is reportedly earning approximately £700,000 per week (£36.4 per year).

We’ll see whether the city of Liverpool welcomes him back once he’s done playing in the Middle East. One hundred million pounds is a lot of money, but I think that’s well short of what it costs to buy a soul.

Over the last three weeks, there has been significant transfer talk/rumors regarding Frenkie de Jong and his future at Barcelona. Clubs connected to the rumor include Manchester United and Manchester City, as only clubs with significant resources could afford de Jong’s services. Barcelona, burdened with debt, believes the club may be forced to accept a transfer offer for de Jong to alleviate the club’s financial solvency crisis and help the club avoid bankruptcy. This article will lay out an alternative scenario in which the club raises the money that de Jong would bring in without sacrificing player who should play an integral role for the club in the next decade.

de Jong’s Role

While this situation, and Barcelona’s financial solvency as a whole, remains murky, the one factor that is clear is de Jong’s role in the Barcelona squad: but for injury or suspension, de Jong played in every match but one in La Liga this season (March 13 v. Osasuna). De Jong is a playmaking midfielder who has both defensive ball-winning qualities and box-to-box qualities going forward with exceptional passing skills in all areas of the game. De Jong, already a midfield mainstay at 25, would continue to be a key player in the Barcelona midfield for the next decade if he stayed with the club. A player with such quality and importance should not be sold without substantial scrutiny, particularly if the sale is financially motivated.

Financial Information

There are two components to the financial information that are critical in the de Jong transfer scenario: Barcelona’s financial state and de Jong’s financial impact on the club. Barcelona’s financial problems are well publicized: approximately 1.4 billion euros in debt, the club has been forced by La Liga to continue to cut its spending limit. Just to remain solvent, Barcelona was unable to re-sign Messi, has restructured a number of players contracts, and was initially unable to register its summer 2021 signings (Depay, Aguero, and Garcia) because the registrations would exceed the salary cap imposed by La Liga. Additionally, La Liga has instituted a 4 to 1 spending ratio for the Blaugrana, meaning that for every four euros brought in by transfer fees or saved on wages, Barcelona can only spend one euro. There’s no way to sugarcoat the Barcelona financial issue: it is dire and a potentially existential threat to the survival of the club.

De Jong, while not the most significant burden, contributes to Barcelona’s financial strain. In addition to the 86 million euro transfer fee (after add-ons) paid in summer 2019, de Jong is rumored to earn 10 million euros per year net (approximately 18 million euros gross) with possible bonuses and incentives on top of the salary. This means that de Jong’s five-year deal will cost Barcelona approximately 180 million euros; however, it is important to note that de Jong has been financial flexible with Barcelona: the Blaugrana currently owe de Jong approximately 7 million euros in deferred salary after an agreement to defer compensation to help Barcelona’s financial situation. Given de Jong’s previous transfer fee and performances at Barcelona, the Blaugrana could expect to receive a transfer fee at or above 100 million euros for de Jong, equating to approximately 7% of Barcelona’s outstanding debt.

Alternative transfers

Barcelona need to raise capital and while de Jong is the easiest path to raising capital, he is not the only path. Barcelona can raise capital through the transfer of other players and piece together the same 100 million plus euros that the de Jong transfer would bring in without losing a key player.

Memphis Depay – 30 million euros

Memphis was undoubtedly a top play for Barcelona, co-leading the team in scoring with 13 goals in all competitions this season. However, he co-led Barcelona in goals with Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang, who scored the same number of goals in 16 fewer matches, having joined in January on a free from Arsenal. After Aubameyang and Ferran Torres joined in January, Memphis’ role in the first team and playing minutes significantly decrease as he was relegated to a bench role/substitute in many games. This bench role is likely to continue in the 2022/2023 season as Ansu Fati returns from injury. Memphis still has plenty of quality, score two goals in Netherlands 4-1 drubbing over Belgium, and a number of clubs would be interested in his services. With his contract up next summer, now may be the right time to cash out on a player that signed on a free transfer and use the profits to keep his international teammate, Frenkie de Jong.

Samuel Umtiti – 5 million euros

This one should be obvious, as Umtiti played in one game for Barcelona this season and was training with the Barcelona B Team at the end of the season. In Umtiti’s defense, Barcelona is pretty deep at center-back, with Araujo, Pique, Mingueza, Eric Garcia, and Lenglet all in front of him on the depth chart. Umtiti’s relegation to the Barcelona B trainings hurts his transfer value, but there are a number of teams, particularly Ligue 1 and newly-promoted Premier League teams, who may be willing to take a chance on the 28-year-old center-back if the price is right.

Clement Lenglet – 15 million euros

Lenglet was mentioned above as ahead of Umtiti on the depth chart, but given Barcelona’s youth and options at the back, Lenglet is an expendable player that may be used to raise funds. Lenglet played a bit part for Barcelona this season, starting in only three games after January 2022. It is clear that Barcelona has moved on from the former Sevilla man, but it is also clear that the French international can still contribute to a top team. Teams in Serie A and Bundesliga who may be looking to strength their back line may be interested in a 26-year-old center-back that is heading into his prime.

Riqui Puig – 15 million euros

This may be an unpopular opinion, but I think Riqui Puig can actually be a long-term bench player/contributor to the Barcelona midfield; however, Puig’s role is not established and he may be sacrificed in the name of Barcelona’s bottom line. The 22-year-old La Masia product appeared sparingly in the 2021/2022 season but has significant upside and the potential to develop into a starting central midfielder for many teams. Previously, Puig had been linked to Leeds, Roma, and a few La Liga teams, so Barcelona may be able to cash in and find a new home for the 22-year-old midfielder this summer.

Phillipe Coutinho – 20 million euros

Coutinho secured a move to Aston Villa last month for approximately 20 million euros. While Barcelona takes a huge loss on the transfer fee, the Blaugrana were able to get Coutinho’s massive wages off their books.

Conclusion

The above five players represent approximately 85 million euros in income, and their names are not the only ones mentioned as potential transfer targets. With wage savings from Ousmane Dembele and other potential transfer targets (Mingueza, Pjanic, Trincao, Griezmann, Manaj), Barcelona can make up the 100 million plus euros that they would likely get for de Jong. The only question is: do they have the will power to make these moves?

These are not necessarily the most valuable or sought-after players available on a free transfer in 2022 (although many are), but rather the most interesting potential free moves in the Summer 2022 window. The movement of the below players could influence or shift the power dynamics in world soccer, and neglecting to analyze the impact would be negligent.

Players Available on a Free in Summer 2022:

Kylian Mbappe

We’re not going to bury the lead on this: Kylian Mbappe is both the best and the most valuable player available on a free transfer this summer, which is not always the case. It is exceedingly rare that any player this talented, let alone a 23-year-old who will be rising into or in his peak for the full 5-year contract he is expected to sign. If Mbappe leaves on a free (as expected), the clear frontrunners are Real Madrid; however, just because Mbappe will not require a transfer fee does not mean he will be cheap. Mbappe is allegedly requesting an 80 million euros signing bonus and a weekly wage around 1 million euros. All told, over a five-year contract, Mbappe is expected to cost Real Madrid 300 million euros, so while Madrid may be saving on the transfer fee, Mbappe certainly will not be cheap. Then again, no player of this caliber ever is.

Paul Pogba

I feel obligated to add Paul Pogba because of his stature and the controversy surrounding his time at Manchester United. That said, where he will end up on a free is anyone’s guess. Initial he was heading to Real Madrid, but they may not have the budget for Pogba and their other summer transfer targets. Next, it was Juventus, but Juventus midfield is already crowded and the club is looking to cut its wage bill by offloading midfielders. Then, the rumor was that Pogba would stay at Manchester United, though there have not been reports of re-opened negotiations. After Manchester United, the rumor was PSG, with Pogba returning to his home country and playing in the French capital. Mino Raiola is out there spinning and sparking rumors, but at this point, no one knows where Pogba will play the 2022/2023 season.

Paulo Dybala

Paulo Dybala appears to be leaving Turin and I, for one, think it’s a great move. I always believed that Juventus neither appreciated nor respected Dybala’s talent, but that’s neither here nor there. The current frontrunners for ‘La Joya’ include AC Milan, Inter Milan, PSG, Atletico Madrid, and Manchester United. Dybala is allegedly demanding 10 million euros per year net, which would be the highest salary for either Milan team. PSG already has significant attacking talent, although it appears they will lose Mbappe and Di Maria on free transfers, and the team may be looking to move on from the drama creator that is Mauro Icardi and his family, talent notwithstanding. Atletico Madrid and Manchester United may look to replace their older South American strikers with a younger South American striker: Both Luis Suarez (Atletico Madrid) and Edinson Cavani (Manchester United) are out of contract and are not expected to re-sign with their respective clubs. It’s important that Dybala and his representatives make a smart choice this summer, but there La Joya will have no shortage of options this summer.

Chelsea Center-Backs (Christensen and Rudiger)

Chelsea is set to have a rough summer with the changes at their back line. Chelsea are set to lose two first team center-backs in Antonio Rudiger and Andreas Christensen on free transfers and are still unable to conduct transfer business due to Roman Abramovich and the sanctions related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Rudiger, 29, and Christensen, 26, are both top quality center-backs who are in or nearing their primes and will command wages and bonuses reflecting that status. Christensen seemed set to sign a new contract at Chelsea until December, when negotiations fell apart and Christensen’s new representatives (after Christensen fired his agent, who is also his father) began looking elsewhere. Now, Christensen is set to move to Barcelona on a free in what multiple news outlets have reported as a “done deal.”

Rudiger’s future move on a free transfer is much murkier. Rudiger, who initially demanded 400,000 pounds per week from Chelsea and rejected a new deal at 200,000 pounds per week, has been linked to nearly every top-level team. These links, which are very possibly strategically leaked by his representatives to increase leverage in negotiations, have been to Real Madrid, Bayern Munich, Manchester United, Juventus, and even staying at Chelsea. No one knows where he will end up, but one thing is certain: 400,000 pounds per week would be an enormous wage for any player, including a 29-year-old center-back available on a free transfer. David Alaba was able to get around 400,000 euros per week from Real Madrid on a free transfer; we will see if Rudiger’s representatives can get their client the same.

Andrea Belotti

After transfer rumors previously linking him to Atletico Madrid, AC Milan, and Manchester United, Belotti is set to leave Torino on a free. There were originally rumors that Belotti would join friend and fellow Italian national teammate Lorenzo Insigne at Toronto FC and while that certainly could still occur, Belotti is a bit younger than his teammate and may not be ready to head across the Atlantic. In recent weeks, Belotti has been linked to a couple of Serie A clubs and a host of Premier League clubs, including West Ham, Wolverhampton, Newcastle, and even transfer-and-signing embargoed Chelsea. Belotti has had inconsistent form over the past 18 months and is having a statistically underwhelming season in Serie A, but he could still command significant wages given his past play and potential.

Franck Kessie

Franck looks to be trading high fashion for the Mediterranean lifestyle this summer. The 25-year-old Ivorian midfielder looks set to leave the San Siro this summer and will reportedly land at Camp Nou. With Busquets, Nico, Gavi, Perdi, de Jong, and now Kessie, the Blaugrana are going to have a very crowded midfield for the 2022/2023 season, not to mention Sergi Roberto and Riqui Puig. Barcelona’s biggest question this summer is going to be: How can we afford these wage demands?

Ousmane Dembele

Once again, we’re talking about Barcelona. However, this time, it’s a player that the Blaugrana might lose, yet might still sign. Ousmane Dembele made international news when he signed for Barcelona in 2017 for 105 million euros plus add-ons. His Barcelona career thus far has been described as moments of brilliance but constantly injured. Now, five years later, Dembele, who will be 25 this summer, may be departing Camp Nou. Negotiations between Dembele’s representatives and Laporta broke down during the winter, but after a recent run of impressive form under new manager Xavi, negotiations between the two parties may be re-opening. However, Barcelona will reportedly need to compete with Newcastle, whose new owners (the Saudis) are likely able to afford a larger weekly wage than the Blaugrana (Financial Fair Play notwithstanding).

Noussair Mazraoui

Mazraoui, the 24-year-old Ajax right-back, is a man in demand this summer. The Moroccan international, who is available on a free transfer, has been in impressive form at the club and international levels. Mazraoui initially appeared to be set for Barcelona this summer, but reports have recently linked Mazraoui to Bayern Munich, which is said to have offered the right-back a 5-year contract at 4.5 million euros net per season, not including bonuses. At around 160,000 euros per week gross, Barcelona may be unable to match that offer and register its other priority signings. So, while Mazraoui has not signed a pre-contract, his future may lie in Bavaria.

Divock Origi

Divock Origi is not the most talented player available on a free this summer, but he may be the most intriguing. The Belgian international, who will be 27 this summer, has been a bench player/super-sub/rotational starter/cult hero for Liverpool, where he has been since 2014. Origi has shown flashes of incredible talent, but has not yet demonstrated that he can play at that high level consistently, be that because of lack of opportunities or lack of capitalizing on opportunities presented. Origi has been linked to a number of clubs: Wolfsburg, where he was previously loaned; AC Milan, who heavily rely on two aging strikers; and Inter Milan who, if nothing else, want to prevent Origi from signing with their rival. Reports indicate that AC Milan is leading the race, having offered a four-year, 3.5 million euros net per season, but Origi has not signed a pre-contract yet.

Ben Brereton Diaz

The only people who knew of Ben Brereton Diaz at this time last year were Blackburn Rovers supports, but that’s now changed. Brereton Diaz became a household name this season due to the 20 goals he scored in the Championship in the first half of the 2021/2022 season. The performance earned him a call-up to the Chilean National Team, had Blackburn destined to earn promotion to the Premier League, and transfer rumors began to swirl. These transfer rumors, and the potential that Brereton Diaz would leave on a free, prompted Blackburn to confirm that Brereton Diaz’s contract expired on June 30, 2022, but that Blackburn held an option which, if exercised, would push the contract expiration date to June 30, 2023. It seemed certain that Blackburn would earn promotion and exercise the option on Brereton Diaz’s contract or sign him to a new contract. However, the second half of the season has gone differently for both Brereton Diaz and Blackburn. Brereton Diaz scored his first goal since December 2021 on April 15, 2022, he faced a ruptured ankle ligament that sidelined him for six weeks, and Blackburn now sits in eighth place in the Championship. While it would make sense for Blackburn to exercise the contract option, what seemed certain is now a question.

Teams may be wary of his recent performances, but if Ben Brereton Diaz is available on a free, it is likely that someone will take a chance on him given his performances in the first half of the 2021/2022 season. Teams that were interested prior to the second-half of the season include Sevilla, West Ham, and Everton. If his contract option is not exercised, someone will get a striker with a high ceiling and a low floor, and we will find out if he is a steal on a free or a poor decision.

In the interest of transparency, I would like to make a disclosure: I am of Italian descent. If Italy is in a competition and the United States is not in that competition, I cheer for the Azzurri. I celebrated at home when Italy won the Euros on penalties, and I felt some sting of defeat when they lost to Macedonia in injury time. That said, the Euro Championship and the World Cup Qualifiers debacle creates a dichotomy between success and failure and an interesting question: How does a team go from European Champions to missing out on the World Cup in a matter of 8 months?

Background

A short background is needed to understand the success/failure dichotomy. During the 2020 UEFA European Championship, which took place in June and July 2021 due to the coronavirus pandemic, saw Italy defeat Turkey, Switzerland, and Wales in the Group Stage. Italy then defeated Austria in the Quarterfinal, Belgium in the Semifinal, and England at home (Wembley Stadium) on penalties in the Final. Italy managed to go 7-0 during the Euros, defeating three teams (potentially four, depending on Wales) who will be 2022 World Cup participants, and defeated a top 10 team in its home stadium in the Final. In short, the 2020 Euros was the most success the Azzurri achieved since its 2006 World Cup victory. But, as stated above, this dichotomy also includes failure.

Italy, despite all of its success in the Euros, underperformed that success during the 2022 World Cup Qualifiers. After starting the Qualifiers with 3 straight wins, the Azzurri drew four of its final five matches and dropped below Switzerland in Group C, leaving the Azzurri with only one option to qualify for the World Cup: the European World Cup playoff. After controlling the match against North Macedonia for a mostly unremarkable 90 minutes, Aleksandar Trajkovski scored from outside the box in the 92^nd minute. With only three minutes left, the Azzurri failed to get level with the North Macedonians and thus failed to qualify for the 2022 World Cup.

Now that everyone’s caught up, let’s examine the factors that led to Italy’s successes and failures.

Factor #1: Match Scheduling

The first potential factor is the European Championship versus World Cup Qualifier schedule. The European Championship is played during the summer, when clubs do not have games and while players are recovering and resting from a long season. Italy’s 2020 Euros included 7 games over the course of one month (June 11 – July 11). During the time, the Azzurri stayed together and trained together. The Azzurri did not play together for a week, only to go back to their respective club team for a number of months before reuniting to once again attempt to qualify for a major tournament.

In contrast, the World Cup qualifying games are played much more sporadically. Players for the national teams get together for 10 days to two weeks at a time, play two to three games during that period, then players travel back to their respective club teams and resume the club season. This can create an inconsistent schedule that can be detrimental to some teams, both national and club.  

Factor #2: Federico Chiesa

The second factor in Italy’s success at the Euros but failure to qualify for the World Cup is one player: Federico Chiesa. Chiesa, who is on loan at Juventus from Fiorentina but will likely secure a permanent transfer to the Bianconeri this summer, was nothing short of a revelation during the 2020 Euros. Chiesa’s 2020 European Championship performance and 2020/2021 club season was so impressive that he was awarded Best Attacker of the Competition and the Italian 2021 Men’s Footballer of the Year. However, in January 2022, Chiesa injured his ACL, ruling him out for the rest of the club season and the World Cup Playoff. Instead of having the Best Attacker of the 2020 Euros Competition, Italy started Domenico Berardi. Berardi is a solid right winger, who has had a great season at Sassuolo and is the subject of some significant transfer speculation, but he is not Federico Chiesa. Italy had 32 shots during the World Cup Playoff, but only 5 of those shots were on goal. With that volume of shots, yet only 15% of the shots on target, Italy surely would have benefited from Chiesa in the line-up against North Macedonia. Chiesa is an outstanding talent and a star for the Azzurri; however, we will have to wait at least four years to see if he can guide them to a World Cup.

Factor #3: Squad Form and Availability

The third factor in Italy’s success at the Euros but failure to qualify for the World Cup is the form and squad selection. The form discussed here is the form of individual players, not necessarily the form of the overall team, although individual form obviously affects the overall team.

During the Italy’s success at the Euros, players in key positions like Ciro Immobile, Leonardo Bonucci, Insigne, Jorginho, and Donnarumma were all in peak form. Each of these players were performing at peak levels; some of these players played the best soccer of their careers. Even players that play a more “supporting” role, such as Nicolo Barella and Manuel Locatelli, were in great form.

In contrast, these players were not in peak form during Italy’s World Cup qualification failure. Immobile was inconsistent (in the last 6 WC qualifying games, excluding the match against Lithuania, Italy scored 2 goals), Jorginho and Insigne were not in peak form, Bonucci was injured for the decisive qualifier playoff match, and Donnarumma has been in poor form since his move to and inconsistent playing time at PSG. The “supporting” players like Barella and Locatelli were either injured or just average. To make it out of the UEFA Qualifier, players (and teams) need to be better than just average.

Conclusion

The aforementioned three key factors, and likely many more, led to Italy’s failure to qualify for the second straight World Cup. The Azzurri missed out in 2018, will miss out in 2022, and qualifying for 2026 is clearly not guaranteed. My personal belief is that the World Cup is more fun and overall better when Italy participates, but I recognize my bias in the matter; however, one thing is clear: the World Cup qualifying schedule does not appear to be changing, so the Azzurri will need to be in better form and will need key players like Federico Chiesa to be healthy to maximize their chances of qualifying for the 2026 World Cup.   

After a long hiatus, we are back to writing articles. For those who stuck around, we appreciate your continued patronage and support.

I’m excited for this article to be the first article back because this trend of overpaying out of fear is a trend that we see across different sports. The trend costs universities across the United States millions of dollars each year in buyout clauses to fire college football coaches. Soccer is not immune to this trend. I do not intend to kick a man while he’s down, but one manager and one club perfectly illustrate this trend: Manchester United and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer.

Solskjaer was initially appointed as a caretaker manager to take over in 2018 for the recently fired Jose Mourinho. Solskjaer was the manager at Molde in Sweden at the time, but a deal was struck between the clubs to allow him to manage Manchester United in a caretaker capacity for the rest of the 2018/2019 season and return to Molde in May 2019 for the Eliteserien season. Though Solskjaer lacked the significant managerial experience that United typically look for in a manager, he was a known quantity around the Carrington training ground: for eleven years (1996-2007), Solskjaer played for Manchester United and was a fan favorite while at Old Trafford. Solskjaer ended up staying beyond his initial appointment, signing a permanent three-year contract with Manchester United in March 2019.

Solskjaer’s first two seasons are best described as consistently inconsistent. For three or four matches in a row, United would look great, reminding fans of the great Alex Ferguson teams in the 2000s. Suddenly, Solskjaer would drop points or lose two matches in a row where United looked like they didn’t deserve to be in the Premier League, let alone in the Top 6. However, the 2019/2020 COVID season was good for Solskjaer: although rivals Manchester City won the league by 12 points, United finished second in the Premier League and qualified for the 2020/2021 Champions League. With one year left to go on Solskjaer’s contract, United had to make a decision: should they sign Solskjaer to an extension or let him go? On one hand, Solskjaer had secured Champions League qualification for United in 2020/2021; on the other hand, Solskjaer had not demonstrated that his substitutions, late game decisions, or other choices were “special” or beyond the capacity of another manager. United chose to sign Solskjaer to an extension rather than bringing in another talented manager like Mauricio Pochettino or Massimiliano Allegri, both of whom were available at the time. United signed him to a new three-year contract in July 2021; five months later, Solskjaer was gone.

When United sacked Jose Mourinho, they paid him and his staff a 19.6 million pounds severance package; 15 million of that went to Mourinho. United apparently learned from that financial misstep and capped any severance package in Solskjaer’s contract extension to 7 million pounds. Nonetheless, 7 million pounds (not include any assistant coach severance) is a significant amount of money to pay a manager whose best accomplishments during his tenure were a second-place finish in the Premier League and a Europa League Final loss. The Solskjaer story at United is a long way to ask and answer a question: Why do clubs sign contracts with managers who, other than on one or two occasions, are average, and why are clubs willing to agree to such large severance packages in the contracts? The answer to these complex scenarios is actually quite simple: fear.

Managers can play a decisive role in a match and a season. The tactical adjustments, timing of substitutions, and other slight changes can be the difference between walking away with one point or three, or rescuing a point that is otherwise undeserved. This ability to capture or rescue points, along with the ability to manage complex personalities of international superstars, is why managers are so highly compensated. It is also why teams are afraid to lose a potentially good manager.

This answer, and the mini-Manchester United case study, sets forth a new question: Where will clubs go from here? A number of clubs have paid a significant amount of money to hire managers that are sub-par or average, hoping that those managers just need one more chance/job/team to prove they are elite. Almost all of these hires have failed to demonstrate that these managers (i.e. Sam Allardyce, Frank de Boer, Steve Bruce, etc.) are anything beyond average. In the ever-increasing arms race that is competitive global soccer, are managers now part of these arms races? Much like player wages since the early 1990s, are managerial wages set to increase at an exponential and alarming rate, ultimately causing financial issues and handicapping teams from signing other talent? Already afraid of losing top managerial talent, this is another fear that clubs should consider as well, but only time will tell whether this warning was heeded.